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Abstract. This paper examines the existence and adequacy of implemented Computerized 
Accounting Information Systems (CAIS) security controls to prevent, detect and correct security 
breaches in Saudi organizations. An empirical survey, using a self-administered questionnaire, 
was carried out to achieve this purpose. Five hundred questionnaires were distributed on a random 
sample of Saudi organizations. Two hundred and seventy five valid, usable questionnaires were 
collected and analyzed. The results of the study highlight a number of inadequately implemented 
CAIS security controls, and some suggestions and recommendations are introduced to strengthen 
the weak points and to close the loopholes in the present CAIS security controls in Saudi 
organizations. From a practical standpoint, managers, auditors, IT users and practitioners alike 
stand to gain from the findings of this study. The results could enable them to better understand 
and secure their CAIS and to champion IT development for the success of their businesses.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Information has become one of the most valuable assets for most organizations. 
Business survival and success are heavily dependent upon the accuracy, integrity 
and continued availability of critical information. The reliance on information 
and continuous changes in technology force organizations to implement security 
controls to protect their Computerized Accounting Information Systems (CAIS) 
against potential security threats. However, the failure to secure the CAIS and 
the information they contain or to make it available when it is required can, and 
does, lead to great financial and non-financial losses. It is argued that individuals 
who are more aware of the potential security threats against their CAIS would be 
more sensitized to the dangers of inadequate security controls and would more 
likely feel that their CAIS security is unsatisfactory. However, many organizations 
do not realize the importance of CAIS security until some unauthorized access 
to their systems occurs or modification, alteration or destruction of their critical 
files has happened. Organizations can no longer disregard the importance of 
information security in the light of computer fraud, hackers and computer viruses. 
Accordingly, the need to understand and employ adequate security controls over 
CAIS has become an issue no business can ignore (Mau and Catlin, 99; Feeney, 
99; Meall, 992; Rockwell, 990; Doost, 990; Corbitt, 996; KPMG, 2000; 
Abu-Musa, 2002 and 2004c).
The rapid change in information technology (IT), the wide spread of user-
friendly systems, and the great desire of organizations to acquire and implement 
up-to-date computerized systems have made computers much easier to use. It 
has also enabled accounting tasks to be accomplished much faster and more 
accurately. On the other hand, IT has created significant risks related to assuring 
the security and integrity of CAIS. IT, in many cases, has been developed faster 
than the advancement in control practices and has not been combined with similar 
development of the employees’ knowledge, skills, awareness, and compliance. 
Implementing adequate security controls over CAIS and its related facilities used 
in handling, recording, processing, storing and distributing information has become 
a necessity
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Middle East and the 
2th largest in the world, measuring approximately 2.2 million square km, has 
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been selected as the location in which to conduct the current survey. It also has the 
largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is an oil-
based economy, having the largest reserves of petroleum in the world (26 percent 
of the proven reserves), ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a 
leading role in OPEC. The kingdom has launched a wave of cautious economic 
reforms aimed among others, at diversifying its oil-based economy and joining 
the WTO, which is evidence of its efforts to succeed in the fast approaching era of 
global integration (Jasimuddin, 200; Sohail and Al-Abdali, 2005). Saudi Arabia 
has a dynamic interaction between traditional culture and modern economic and 
business realities which make Saudi Arabia a unique culture (Yavas and Yasin, 
999) in which to implement the current study.
The Kingdom of Saudi economy can be considered as a “one-crop economy,” 
which relies basically on oil exports for its revenues. However, there is a dramatic 
shift in the economy of Saudi Arabia. While the phenomenal boom experienced 
by the Saudi economy came to its standstill during the Gulf War, the economy 
managed to regain its strength recently, and it is expected to be one of the strongest 
economies in the world. Several commodities ranging from fertilizer to pipes to 
furniture are produced in plants located at various industrial estates throughout the 
Kingdom. In order to remain competitive, computerization has become a necessity 
rather than a luxury for these manufacturers. Furthermore, service organizations 
need computerization more than ever before to improve their performance, satisfy 
their customers’ needs, and to reduce operating costs without compromising service 
quality (Curtiss, 995, Yavas & Yasin, 994, 997, and 999).
It is argued that while Saudi Arabia is rich in capital, it has had and continues to 
have an inadequate local supply of computer specialists. In an attempt to close the 
supply-demand gap in native computer specialists, and to acquire the contemporary 
computer know-how, over the years Saudi students were sent abroad (particularly 
to the United States) to obtain their education and to bridge the gap of a good 
domestic supply of computer specialists. In spite of this, Saudi computer and IT 
education is still not coping with an increasing demand for computer professionals 
(Curtiss, 995; Yavas and Yasin, 999). Recently however, the education authorities 
responsible for higher education have moved to reconsider the curriculum to meet 
business demands for more graduates who can cope with global business changes 
(Al-Sudairy and Tang, 2000).
28
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
The main objective of this study is to investigate and evaluate the existence 
and adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations in 
order to prevent, detect and correct CAIS security breaches. The current study also 
aims to investigate if there are significant differences among Saudi organizations 
regarding the implemented CAIS security controls.
An empirical survey has been carried out on a random sample of Saudi 
organizations, using a self-administered questionnaire, to achieve the research 
objectives. The current study is an attempt to investigate the following two research 
questions:
• Are there adequate security controls implemented to protect CAIS against the 
perceived security threats in Saudi organizations?
• Are there significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding imple-
mented CAIS security controls?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section after the 
introduction presents the literature review and previous studies related to security 
controls of CAIS. This is followed by the statement of research hypotheses. The 
study’s research method is then described. This is followed by the presentation 
and analysis of the study’s major empirical results. The final section of this paper 
provides conclusions and recommendations for further research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the literature reveals diverse views regarding the classification of 
CAIS security controls. Security controls of CAIS could be classified according to 
their purpose: to deter, prevent, detect and correct security threats. The objective 
of deterrent security controls is to create an atmosphere of control compliance, 
while preventative security controls should be designed to reduce the possibility 
of an attack. Once a system has been violated, detective controls could help in 
identifying the occurrence of harm and security breaches. Corrective controls 
serve to reduce the impact of the threat after a loss has occurred. Thus, the purpose 
of corrective controls is to aid in recovery from damage or in reduction of the 
harmful effects of its occurrence (for more details, see: Qureshi and Siegel, 997; 
and Abu-Musa, 2004c).
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Security controls can also be categorized according to their association with the 
data processing stages: e.g. input, processing, storing and output security controls. 
The purpose of input controls is to ensure that each transaction is authorized, 
processed correctly and processed only once. Processing controls should be used 
to ensure that transactions entered into CAIS are valid and accurate, that external 
data are not lost or altered and that invalid transactions are reprocessed correctly. 
Output security controls are used to ensure that no unauthorized copies of output 
were made, and that the printouts are directed only to authorized individuals. 
Storage security controls ensure that all stored data and programs are secured 
against unauthorized access, manipulation, alteration and disclosure. Alternatively, 
security controls could also be classified according to their nature, including for 
example, organizational, physical access, data and data integrity, software, off-line 
programs and data security controls.
Reviewing the literature reveals a paucity of studies concerned with evaluating 
the security controls of CAIS in developing countries, which represents a relatively 
new area for research. Boockholdt (989) examined the impact of computer security 
and data integrity of linking personal computers in user departments with the 
corporate mainframe computer. Eighty-five Certified Information Systems Auditors 
were surveyed to investigate their views regarding data security and integrity. The 
results of the study reveal that access and physical security controls, data backup 
and maintenance of hardware have become critical. Security classification of data 
should be established and different access restrictions for each classification should 
be implemented. Many of these security controls are included in our proposed 
CAIS security controls checklist to be tested in Saudi organizations.   
Buttross and Ackers (990) discussed microcomputer security exposure and 
microcomputer organizational, hardware, software and data security controls. 
They introduced a proposed security controls checklist that could be used to help 
internal auditors in identifying and correcting their CAIS security exposures through 
evaluating the security controls. The checklist included the following security 
control categories: organizational controls, hardware controls, software controls, 
and data and data integrity controls. The checklist was mainly designed for small 
and medium-sized organizations. Again, a selected number of security controls 
introduced by Buttross and Ackers (990) were incorporated in our proposed 
checklist to be empirically investigated in the Saudi environment.
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Collier et al. (99) conducted research to explore how public service 
organizations assign responsibility for the prevention and detection of computer 
fraud. The results of the study revealed that most respondents considered that the 
specific responsibility for countering computer fraud was not consistently attributed 
within their organizations. Respondents mentioned that the information services 
function most commonly held the responsibility for computer fraud prevention and 
detection. However, 56 percent of the respondents considered the internal audit 
departments to be responsible for detecting and preventing computer fraud.
In 992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report introduced 
a framework for the consideration of control risks, which expanded the focus of the 
traditional view of controls at the detailed account and assertion level to include 
a global business perspective. The COSO framework was integrated into SAS 55 
(988) and 78 (995). These standards direct the auditor to consider the broader 
business and control risks of a company, which can have a direct impact on potential 
misstatements in the financial statements or on appropriate disclosures.
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) and the Information Systems Audit 
and Control Foundation (ISACA) (992) developed the Control Objectives for 
Information and Related Technology (COBIT). COBIT provides managers, 
auditors, and IT users with a set of generally accepted IT control objectives to 
assist them in maximizing the benefits derived through the use of IT and developing 
the appropriate IT governance and control in their organizations. The first edition 
of COBIT was published in 996, the second edition in 998, the third edition 
in 2000, and the on-line edition became available in 200. COBIT incorporates 
generally applicable and accepted international standards for good practice of IT 
management and control. Many of the COBIT security controls were selected 
and incorporated in the proposed checklist to be empirically tested in the Saudi 
business environment.
ISO 7799 also introduces a comprehensive set of controls comprising best 
practices in information security. It is a recognized generic international information 
security standard. ISO 7799 was originally published in the early 990’s as the 
“DTI Code of Practice”, by the Department of Trade & Industry in the UK. In 
995, it was further developed and published as BS 7799 by the British Standards 
Institute, which was updated again in 999. The original BS 7799 was revised and 
reissued in September 2002.
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The ISO 7799 standard is comprised of ten main sections: security 
policy, system access control, computer & operations management, system 
development and maintenance, physical and environmental security, compliance, 
personnel security, security organization, asset classification and control, and 
business continuity management. Many of the security controls were also selected 
and incorporated in the proposed security controls checklist to be empirically 
investigated in the Saudi organizations.  
In December (2000), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established a joint technical 
committee named ISO/IEC. The committee developed and published the ISO/IEC 
7799:2000 (The Code of Practice for Information Security Management), which is 
now considered as the international standard and the best practice for implementing 
security management. The standard was published in 2000 in its first edition, and 
updated in June 2005. 
Dougan (994) suggested an alternative internal control checklist for computer 
systems. This checklist could be used to check security controls in place and to 
ensure that the implemented security procedures are adequate and effective to 
prevent computer data losses and security breaches. Dougan, grouped the security 
controls under four main categories, namely: computer room site (physical security), 
documentation, maintenance, and protection of data. According to Dougan, the 
suggested security checklist could be useful for those who have nothing; and for 
others it may serve as a prod to recheck their internal controls. 
Solms (996) has addressed the general background regarding CAIS security 
evaluations and has discussed the scope and responsibility for information security. 
His paper discusses a number of information security evaluation schemes and 
certification techniques, such as: Trusted Security Evaluation Criteria schemes, 
ISO 9000 (BS 570), the Code of Practice for Information Security Management, 
BS 7799, and Self Evaluation of Security Techniques.
Henry (997) surveyed 26 companies in Hampton Roads, Virginia, USA, 
to determine the nature of their accounting systems and security in use. Henry 
discussed and tested the following seven CAIS security methods: encryption, 
password access, backup of data, virus protection, authorization for system changes, 
physical system security, and periodic audits. The results of Henry’s survey indicate 
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that 80. percent of the companies backup their accounting systems. 74.4 percent of 
the companies secure their accounting system with passwords, but only 42.7 percent 
utilize protection from viruses. Physical security and authorization for changes to 
the system are employed by less than 40 percent of the respondents. The survey 
results also show that only 5 companies use encryption for their accounting data. 
Almost 45 percent of the sample underwent some sort of audit of their accounting 
data. Selected security controls were incorporated in our proposed security controls 
checklist to be empirically investigated in Saudi Arabia.
In 997, Qureshi and Siegel discussed the responsibility of accountants 
regarding assuring the security of CAIS. The paper discussed the anticipated 
physical access and communication security controls, which include deterrent 
controls, preventive controls, detective controls, input controls and processing 
security controls. Many of the security controls introduced by Qureshi and Siegel 
(997) are selected to be empirically tested in the Saudi environment. 
Hood and Yang (998) studied the security of banking information systems 
in China. The results revealed that management was aware of security but the 
respondents believed that their banks had not taken enough action to reduce 
the potential risks and losses due to the lack of financial and human resources. 
Concerning security controls, two thirds of the respondents believed that their 
banking system could be protected from internal attack, while less than half were 
not confident about external attacks. Moreover, it seems that passwords, daily 
backups, and monitoring of network activities were the most common security 
controls in the Chinese banking system. 
In 996 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued 
the “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information 
Technology Systems.” The document provides a baseline that organizations 
can use to establish and review their information technology security programs. 
Management, internal auditors, users, system developers, and security practitioners 
could use the guideline to gain an understanding of the basic security requirements 
most information technology systems should contain. In 998, NIST also issued 
the guide for developing security plans for information technology systems to 
improve protection of information technology resources. The purpose of the 
security plan was to provide an overview of the security requirements of the CAIS 
and to describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. 
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The security plan also delineates responsibilities and expected behavior of all 
individuals who access CAIS.
Zviran and Haga (999) carried out an empirical study to evaluate password 
security as one of the most common control mechanisms for authenticating users of 
CAIS. The study investigated the core characteristics of user-generated passwords 
and the associations among those characteristics. The results of the study revealed 
that despite the widespread use of passwords, little attention has been given to the 
characteristics of their actual use. The results also revealed that almost 50 percent 
of the users surveyed in this study reported passwords composed of five or fewer 
characters, the vast majority of respondents use only alphabetic characters and 
never changed their password. The findings also highlight the need to investigate 
the effectiveness of educational efforts to raise the security consciousness of 
system users. 
Dhillon (999) argued that many of the losses resulting from computer-related 
fraud could be avoided if organizations adopted a more pragmatic approach 
to dealing with such incidents. The paper encourages organizations to adopt a 
balanced approach to security controls which places equal emphasis on technical, 
formal and informal interventions against their computerized systems in order to 
minimize the losses of computer fraud.
In 2000, the public oversight board (POB) discussed the issue of unique risks 
and controls posed by increasingly sophisticated information processing systems. 
The board encouraged auditors to expand their knowledge of new business-oriented 
information systems, as such knowledge would facilitate the development of more 
effective audit approaches. The POB also recognized the need of attracting and 
retaining qualified technology specialists for audit support.
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) discussed the confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, responsibility, trust and ethicality principles as key factors for 
successful management of information security in the next millennium. Again, 
the paper recommended paying equal attention to technical and organizational 
security controls in designing and evaluating CAIS. 
Siponen (2000) introduced a conceptual foundation for organizational 
information security awareness programs to minimize end-user errors and to 
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enhance the effectiveness of implemented CAIS security controls. Siponen 
emphasized the importance of information security awareness. He argued that 
prescribed information security techniques or procedures would lose their 
real usefulness if they were misused, misinterpreted, not used, or not properly 
implemented by end-users. 
Detecting and preventing unauthorized access to CAIS by internal and external 
parties has become an important issue. The results of Furnell and Dowland’s 
(2000) study revealed that traditional methods of user authentication and access 
security control do not provide comprehensive protection and offer opportunities 
for compromise by various classes of abuse. 
Coffin and Patilis (200) studied the role of internal auditors in evaluating the 
security controls for protecting sensitive data in financial institutions such as banks, 
security firms, and insurance companies. They argued that internal auditing could 
significantly help organizations in determining and evaluating the implemented 
CAIS security controls as well as compliance with applicable regulations. 
White and Pearson (200) surveyed over two hundred US companies to 
investigate the security controls related to the personal use of computers, controlling 
e-mail accounts, and securing company data. The results of the study reinforced 
the need for better security control in the majority of surveyed companies. The 
results also revealed that many companies began to use computer technology 
before implementing appropriate safeguards; and the majority of the companies’ 
safeguards continued to be lacking. 
Warren (2002) carried out a survey to investigate the security practices of 
computerized information systems in three countries: Australia, the U.K. and 
the U.S.A. The paper attempted to evaluate security practices from different 
perspectives and to investigate whether the security practices varied from one 
country to another. The results of the survey revealed that:
• In Australia, poor levels of computer security were found among Australian 
organizations. Many of the security problems were identified as implementa-
tion of poor security procedures. The results also indicated that 45 percent of 
organizations do not budget for computer security. 
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• In the U.K., 42 percent of organizations did not have an information security 
policy. The findings also revealed that 49 percent of the organizations listed 
budget constraints as being an issue in implementing computer security. 
• In the U.S.A., theft of information and financial fraud cause the most finan-
cial damage. However, differences in the levels of CAIS abuses carried out 
by internal and external individuals were not significant. The paper suggested 
that U.S. security practices seem to be more effective than those of Australia 
or the U.K. 
Wright and Wright (2002) conducted an exploratory study to obtain an 
understanding of the unique risks associated with the implementation of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems using a semi-structured interview approach. 
The research findings showed that the potential for financial statement errors and 
business risks were intensified as a result of the lack of proper user training. The 
findings also showed that ongoing risks differed across ARP applications and 
across vendor packages. Finally, the results suggested that major firms use process 
audit techniques, as opposed to validation testing (i.e., they do not rely on tests of 
output), when hired to provide assurance on the risks for an ERP system.
Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (200) in 
the U.S.A. issued its initial publication draft titled “Standards for Security 
Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems.” This publication 
establishes three potential levels of risk (low, moderate, and high) for each of the 
stated security objectives (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) relevant to 
securing CAIS. The proposed levels of risk are more heavily weighted toward the 
impact of risk on the security of CAIS and the potential magnitude of harm than 
on the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (200) performed a 
review at the Financial Management Service (FMS) during the period from October 
2002 to June 200 to investigate whether FMS: () conducted a comprehensive 
security risk assessment and (2) documented and implemented appropriate security 
measures and controls for the system’s protection. The results of the GAO review 
(200) revealed that although FMS and the Federal Reserve implemented numerous 
security controls to protect their computing resources, risks were not sufficiently 
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assessed, and numerous security control weaknesses were identified. Accordingly, 
immediate actions to correct the weaknesses and to promptly address new security 
threats and risks as they emerge to CAIS were highly recommended. 
Abu-Musa (2004c) carried out a survey to investigate the existence and 
adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in the Egyptian banking sector 
(EBS). The results of study revealed that the vast majority of Egyptian banks 
have adequate CAIS security controls in place. The results also revealed that the 
computer departments paid relatively more attention to technical security controls 
(such as: software and electronic access security controls, data and data entry 
security controls, off-line programs and data security controls, utility security 
controls, bypassing security controls, and user programming security controls); 
while internal audit departments emphasized the behavioral and organizational 
security controls (e.g. organizational security controls, division of duties, and 
output security controls). The study provides invaluable empirical results regarding 
inadequacies of implemented CAIS security controls, and introduces some 
suggestions to strengthen the security controls in the EBS.
In a very recent study, Hunton et al. (2005) conducted an experiment to 
understand, assess and examine the extent to which financial auditors and 
information systems (IS) audit specialists recognize differences in the nature and 
unique business and audit risks associated with ERP systems, as compared with 
traditional computerized (non-ERP) systems. The research findings revealed that 
financial auditors were significantly less concerned about ERP risks compared to 
IS audit specialists. Moreover, IS audit specialists were less confident in financial 
auditors’ abilities to recognize the unique risks posed by ERP systems, which could 
have harmful effects on audit quality.
It is observed that most of the previous studies in the CAIS security controls 
research area have been carried out in developed countries, but few studies have 
investigated CAIS security controls issues in developing countries. It is believed 
that conducting this research in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia, can 
yield fruitful results.
It is also observed that different authors have their own research agendas 
regarding the security aspects of CAIS. Accordingly, CAIS security controls have 
been investigated in a piecemeal rather than in an integrated fashion. The current 
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study developed and tested an integrated and comprehensive checklist of CAIS 
security controls. The proposed checklist could be used by any organization to 
conduct a self-evaluation of its CAIS security controls. The proposed checklist 
would help managers, internal and external auditors in identifying and correcting 
computer security exposures, and could enable them to evaluate the adequacy 
of implemented security controls. From a practical standpoint, managers and 
practitioners alike stand to gain from the findings of this study. The results enable 
managers and practitioners to better secure their CAIS and to champion information 
technology development for the success of their business.
3. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The current research is an attempt to examine the following research 
hypotheses:  
H: The implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations are 
inadequate.
H2: There are no significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding 
the adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls.
H: There are no significant differences among different respondent 
groups regarding the adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in their 
organizations.
In this study, an empirical survey – using a self-administered questionnaire 
– was conducted to investigate and evaluate the existence and adequacy of 
implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations. The questionnaire was 
pre-tested on selected members of academic staff and accounting practitioners and 
was piloted on a selected sample of Saudi organizations. Comments and suggestions 
were considered in the development and revision of the final questionnaire. The 
questionnaire incorporated the proposed CAIS security controls check-list to be 
empirically investigated in Saudi organizations. The proposed checklist classified 
CAIS security controls under the following main security groups: organizational 
security controls, hardware and physical access security controls, software and 
electronic access security controls, data and data integrity security controls, off-
line programs and data security controls, utilities security controls, bypassing of 
8
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
normal access security controls, user programming security controls, division of 
duties, output security controls, and periodic security controls. 
The proposed check-list used “Yes” or “No” questions to make it easy for 
respondents to answer these questions and to go through the security check-list. 
In order to increase the respondent’s motivation for completing the check-list, all 
questions that were similar in content and dealt with the same security control area 
or group were collected together under that specific security group. Also, to make 
it easy for respondents to answer its questions and go smoothly through the list 
the author meticulously considered the sequence and arrangement of the security 
controls in the check-list. Moreover, in deciding the order of the questions involved, 
the author tried to take advantage of the cognitive ties that the respondents would 
be likely to make among these groups. 
 A number of security controls countermeasures involved in the proposed 
security controls check-list were adopted from established research and available 
literature in the information security area (Boockholt, 989; Buttross and Ackers, 
990; Collier et al. 99, Jenkins et al., 992; Dougan, 994; Henry, 997; Qureshi 
and Siegel, 997; ISO 7799; CobiT rd Edition, and Abu-Musa, 2004c). Others, 
however, were specifically developed to meet the needs and requirements of 
this research. The final revised version of the questionnaire is used to survey the 
existence and implementation of CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations. 
The questionnaire is also used to collect the required information related to business 
and respondents profiles.
 Five hundred questionnaires randomly distributed to different types of 
Saudi organizations (Manufacturing companies, banks, insurance companies, 
retail merchandising; oil and gas companies, services companies, health care, 
government units, and others) in seven Saudi cities: Riyadh, Jeddah, Dhahran, 
Dammam, Thuqba, Khubar, and Jubeel. After the follow up, three hundred and five 
questionnaires – representing a 6 percent initial response rate – were collected. 
However, 0 incomplete questionnaires were excluded from the analysis. The 
respondents refused to complete the questionnaires, claiming that they contained 
sensitive and confidential information. After excluding the incomplete and invalid 
responses, the research ended with 275 valid and usable questionnaires, representing 
a 55 percent response rate. This response rate is considered a relatively high 
response rate in this kind of empirical survey.
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A reliability test was carried out on the questionnaire using the Alpha 
Cronbach model, to explore its internal consistency, based on the average inter-
item correlation. The result of the reliability test shows that the questionnaire 
design is highly reliable, and the collected data related to the implemented CAIS 
security controls in Saudi organizations are highly reliable and consistent (Alpha 
= 0.875). The student test was carried out investigate if there were any significant 
differences between early responses (90 questionnaires) and late responses (85 
questionnaires). The results of the student test show no significant differences 
between early and late responses (at significance level p 0.05), which provides 
evidence of a representative and unbiased selected research sample.
The collected data show that 6 of the responding organizations were 
manufacturing companies and 4 were retail merchandising organizations, 
representing 22.2 percent and 4.9 percent of the total responses respectively (Table 
I). 4 respondents were banks – representing 2.4 percent of the total response. 
25 respondents (9. percent) belonged to governmental units and 20 respondents 
(7. percent) were insurance companies. Moreover, 22 respondents (8 percent) 
were services organizations and 7 respondents (6.2 percent) were from the oil 
and gas industry. In addition, 8 respondents, representing 6.5 percent of the total 
belonged to health care organizations (Table I).  7 respondents (.5 percent of 
the total) belonged to other organizations, e.g.  hotels, car rental organizations, 
décor and carpentry firms, publishing and printing organizations, accounting and 
auditing firms, construction companies, and design organizations.
The Research Sample According to
 Business Type
The Research Sample According to Respondents 
Type
Type of Business Frequency Percent Job Title Frequency Percent
Manufacturing 6 22.2 Internal Auditor 9 4.2
Banking 4 2.4 Staff Accountant 99 6.0
Insurance 20 7. Cost Accountant 20 7.
Retail Merchandising 4 4.9 Controller 6 .
Services 22 8.0 EDP Auditor 4 .5
Government 25 9. Manager 55 20.0
Oil and Gas 7 6.2 Other 22 8.0
Health Care 8 6.5
Other 7 .5
Total 275 100.0 Total 275 100.0
Table I. The Research Sample 
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As (Table I) shows 99 respondents (6 percent) were accountants; 55 
respondents (20 percent) were managers; 9 respondents (4.2 percent) were 
internal auditors; and 6 respondents (. percent) were controllers. Moreover, 20 
respondents (7. percent) were working as cost accountants and four respondents 
were EDP auditors. Again, the respondents seem to be quite representative of the 
job structure in Saudi organizations.
 The collected data has been analyzed using the statistical package for social 
sciences (SPSS) version 2. Descriptive statistics (such as frequencies and 
percentages) of the collected data is performed to identify the main characteristics 
of the research variables. In addition, non-parametric test (the Kruskal-Wallis test) 
is carried out to test the research hypotheses related to the existence and adequacy 
of implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations.  Non-parametric 
tests – rather than parametric tests – are the most appropriate statistical tests for 
analyzing data collected in this research since these tests are “distribution free,” 
do not require normal distribution of data, and can efficiently deal with small 
samples. Non-parametric tests are also very suitable to analyze nominal, ordinal, 
categorical, and scale ranked data (See: Dickinson, 990; Miller, 99; Hessler, 
992; Melville and Goddard, 996; Wackerly et al., 996; and Abu-Musa, 2004b 
and 2004a).
4. RESULTS
The statistical findings of the existence and adequacy of implemented CAIS 
security controls as well as the significant differences among Saudi organizations 
and different respondent groups will be presented and discussed in the following 
sections.
Organizational security controls
To explore the existence and adequacy of the implemented organizational 
security controls in Saudi organizations, the respondents were given an 
organizational security controls checklist and they were asked to indicate the 
controls actually implemented in their organizations. A majority of the respondents 
(74.5 percent) believed that their organizations’ management has a serious and 
a positive attitude toward CAIS security. Almost two-thirds of the respondents 
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(6. percent) indicated the existence and implementation of job rotation in their 
organizations to increase the chance of exposure of errors and irregularities. 
Moreover, 7.5 percent of the respondents agreed that their organizations’ personnel 
policies include background checks to reduce the likelihood of hiring dishonest 
employees (Table II). Slightly more than half of the respondents (approximately 
55 percent) confirmed that their organizations’ employees are properly trained on 
their CAIS and that employees are aware of security issues; furthermore, these 
training programs are well documented.
Organizational Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Management attitude toward the security of the 
computerized accounting information system as 
reflected by its actions is appropriate.
205 74.5 70 25.5
2- Rotation of duties is utilized to increase the 
chance of exposure of errors and irregularities. 74 6. 0 6.7
- Mandatory vacations used to reduce the like-
lihood of fraud or embezzlement resulting from 
increased chance of exposure. 
25 45.5 50 54.5
4- Personnel policies include background checks 
to reduce the likelihood of hiring dishonest 
employees.
202 7.5 7 26.5
5- There is documentation showing that users have 
been properly trained. 5 54.9 24 45.
6- The employees who have access to sensitive 
data have been bonded. 94 4.2 8 65.8
Table II. Organizational Security Controls
On the other hand, a relatively high proportion of the respondents (almost 66 
percent) believed that access to their organizations’ sensitive data is not restricted 
to those employees who have a special need to deal with them. Moreover, slightly 
more than half of the respondents (54.5 percent) believed that mandatory vacations 
are not yet implemented in their organizations, despite knowledge that mandatory 
employee vacations reduce the likelihood of fraud or embezzlement and increase 
the chance of their exposure. 
The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) reveals significant differences 
among the different Saudi organizations regarding the existence and adequacy 
of the implemented organizational security controls (p 0.05). Moreover, the 
statistical results of Kruskal-Wallis (Table XIII) show no significant differences 
in the opinions of different respondent groups regarding the same issue in their 
organizations (at significance level p 0.05).
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Organizational 
Security 
Controls
Hardware 
Security 
Controls
Software 
Security 
Controls
Data 
Security 
Controls
Off-line Data & 
Program Security 
Controls
Chi-
Square 22.498 4.58 4.649 2.474 .09
df 8 8 8 8 8
Asymp. 
Sig. .004 .068 .066 . .08
Utility 
Security 
Controls
Bypassing 
Security 
Controls
User 
Programming 
Security Controls
Division of 
Duties
Output 
Security 
Controls
Chi-
Square 2.86 5.700 26.644 .56 29.40
df 8 8 8 8 8
Asymp. 
Sig. .5 .047 .00 .000 .000
Table XII. The Results of Kruskal Wallis Test According to Business Type
Organizational 
Security 
Controls
Hardware 
Security 
Controls
Software 
Security 
Controls
Data
 Security 
Controls
Off-line Data & 
Program Security 
Controls
Chi-Squa-
re
4.40 9.66 2.0 7.057 2.25
df 6 6 6 6 6
Asymp. 
Sig. .62 .54 .002 .6 .002
Utility Securi-
ty Controls
Bypassing Secu-
rity Controls
User Program-
ming Security 
Controls
Division of 
Duties
Output Secu-
rity Controls
Chi-Square .848 8.22 .2 9.065 7.07
df 6 6 6 6 6
Asymp. Sig. .0 .25 .000 .70 .009
Table XIII. The Results of Kruskal Wallis Test According to Respondents Type
Recommendation: According to the above results, it is recommended that 
measures should be taken to restrict access to organizations’ sensitive data to the 
authorized employees with defined needs. Mandatory vacations of employees 
should be taken where not already implemented. Enhanced personnel policies, 
including the rotation of duties, could reduce the likelihood of organizations 
experiencing fraud or embezzlement by increasing the chance of their exposure.
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Hardware and physical access security controls
The statistical results show that the majority of the respondents (82.5 percent) 
believed that the theft and hazard insurance covering their organizations’ computer 
hardware is adequate; 77.8 percent of the respondents indicated that access to their 
CAIS is limited and restricted to employees with defined needs (Table III).
The findings also reveal that the vast majority of the respondents (82.9 percent) 
reported the existence of uninterruptible power supply units to supply power 
during power outages. Approximately 8 percent confirmed the existence of line 
co-coordinators to smooth out power supply; and 79 percent of those respondents 
confirmed the existence of extinguishers close at hand in their organizations. 
A high proportion of the respondents confirmed the adequacy of implemented 
security controls to restrict physical access to their organizations’ computer 
terminals, to the computer room, to hardware outside the computer room (such 
as network switch-gear, or modems) and to communications lines (for example, 
cables sealed in ducts outside the hardware area to prevent tapping or reading by 
service equipment) (Table III).
Hardware and Physical Access Security 
Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Adequate theft and hazard insurance covering 
computers’ hardware. 227 82.5 48 7.5
2- Limiting computer access to employees with a 
defined need. 24 77.8 6 22.2
- Installing computers only in areas that are locked 
and kept under surveillance when not in use. 40 50.9 5 49.
4- Bolting computer to desks or tables. 65 2.6 20 76.5
5- Placing lockable covers on computers. 98 5.6 77 64.4
6-Installing alarms and motion detectors in areas with 
high concentration of computer equipment. 00 6.4 75 64.6
7- Placing internal trip alarms inside computers. 87 .6 88 68.4
8- Line co-coordinators to smooth out power. 228 82.9 47 7.
9- Un-interruptible power supply units to supply 
power during power outages. 2 84 44 6
0- Extinguishers exist and close at hand. 27 78.9 58 2.2
- Placement of computers away from the sprinkler 
system to    avoid  water damage. 58 57.5 7 42.5
2- Waterproof covers to avoid water damage 47 5.5 28 46.5
- Implementation of a smoking ban, or use of 
small fans around the computer to blow any smoke 
away from the system.
72 62.5 0 7.5
4- Avoidance of other potential pollutants (e.g., 
dust, food, and coffee) around the computer. 97 7.6 78 28.4
Table III. Hardware and Physical Access Security Controls
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Hardware and Physical Access Security 
Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
5- There are adequate controls to restrict physical 
access to the following:
A. terminals, 202 7.5 7 26.5
B. computer room, 2 76.7 64 2.
C. hardware outside the computer room (e.g. network 
switch-gear, modems), 82 66.2 9 .8
E. communications lines (e.g., cables should be 
sealed in ducts outside the hardware area to prevent 
tapping or reading by service equipment).
9 69.5 84 0.5
6- Adequate controls over:
A. generating and revoking the means of permitting 
physical access (e.g. key, security badge, combina-
tion number, switch card);
68 6. 07 8.8
B. where applicable, un-issued physical accesses 
permit badges or keys? 46 5. 29 46.9
7- The person responsible for controlling physical 
access should be independent of programming, sys-
tem software, and accounting control functions.
6 58.5 4 4.5
8- The previous physical access procedures are sub-
ject to adequate supervision by a responsible official. 92 69.8 8 0.2
Table III (Continued). Hardware and Physical Access Security Controls
As Table III shows, 57.5 of the respondents indicated that their organizations’ 
computer systems are located in areas physically isolated from the sprinkler system, 
to avoid water damage. Moreover, to avoid potential pollutants (such as smoke, dust, 
food and coffee) no smoking, eating or drinking is allowed around the computers 
in the majority of Saudi organizations. Slightly more than half of the respondents 
(5.5 percent) mentioned that waterproof covers are used in their organizations 
and merely half of the respondents believed that their organizations’ computers 
are installed in secured areas, which are locked and kept under surveillance when 
not in use.
Table III also shows that a relatively high proportion of the respondents (6. 
percent) affirmed the adequacy of security controls implemented over generating 
and revoking the means of permitting physical access to their accounting systems 
(by keys, security badges, combination numbers, switch cards). Moreover, un-
issued physical access media are reported to be under security control and all 
physical access procedures are subject to adequate supervision by a responsible 
person. Further, 58.5 percent of the respondents confirmed that the individuals who 
are responsible for controlling physical access are entirely independent of those 
who are responsible for the programming, system software, and accounting control 
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functions in their organizations. Approximately 70 percent of the respondents 
confirmed that the above physical access procedures are subject to adequate 
supervision by a responsible official.
On the other hand, the majority of the respondents (76.5 percent) reported 
that their organizations’ computers were not bolted to the desks and 64.4 percent 
of the total mentioned that no lockable covers are placed on the organizations’ 
computers. However, many of them confirmed that they have disk-less computer 
machines. A high proportion of the respondents (almost 65 percent) confirmed 
the absence of internal trip alarms inside their computers. More than two-thirds 
of the respondents (almost 68.4 percent) revealed that neither alarms nor motion 
detectors are installed in areas with a high concentration of computer equipment 
in their organizations (Table III).
According to the statistics of the Kruskal-Wallis tests (Table XII), it seems 
that there are no significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding the 
existence and implementation of the hardware and physical access security controls 
at significance level p 0.05. Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics (Table XIII) 
show no significant differences among the opinions of different respondent groups 
regarding the existence and implementation of the hardware and physical access 
security controls in their organizations at p 0.05.  
Recommendation: Based on the previous empirical results, Saudi organizations 
are recommended to install alarms and motion detectors in areas with a high 
concentration of computer equipment. Installing computers only in areas that are 
locked and kept under surveillance when not in use, placing lockable covers on 
computers and bolting computer to desks or tables should be considered. Un-issued 
physical access badges and keys should be under adequate control and complete 
independence of individuals who are responsible for controlling physical access 
and those who are responsible for programming, system software, and accounting 
control functions should be considered.
Software and electronic access security controls
The statistical results in Table IV show that the majority of the organizations’ 
respondents (82.9 percent) confirmed the installation of virus protection software in 
their accounting systems and that software is updated regularly. The vast majority of 
46
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
the respondents (86.2 percent) also confirmed that all the software used is original 
and that adequate procedures are in place to avoid the use of bootleg software and 
unauthorized copying of licensed software. Moreover, all backups and working 
copies of software and data are well maintained.
Software Security and Access  
Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Virus protection software should be installed. 228 82.9 47 7.
2- Sensitive data transmitted should be encrypted. 5 54.9 24 45.
- The present insurance should cover software. 9 4. 56 56.7
4- Insurance extended to cover the cost of business 
interruption resulting from a computer mishap. 4 4.9 24 85.
5- Backups and working copies of software and data 
are well maintained. 24 88.4 2 .6
6- Software backups, like originals, should have 
write-protect tabs in place. 27 86.2 8 .8
7- Originals placed in an off –site storage (e.g., a 
safe-deposit box or the home of the owner or chief 
executive officer).
6 59. 2 40.7
8- Adequate steps should be taken to avoid unauthori-
zed copying of licensed software. 209 76 66 24
9- Adequate steps should be taken to avoid the use of 
bootleg software. 28 79. 57 20.7
0- There is an adequate combination of software 
procedures and manual action to:
A. prevent unauthorized accesses, report and investi-
gate persistent attempts to bypass  the access controls, 
or
20 8.6 45 6.4
B. report and investigate unauthorized accesses. 2 84.7 42 5.
- Are there controls over:
A. assigning access rights to appropriate  individual in 
the organization, 206 74.9 69 25.
B. granting and revoking authorized access on the sys-
tem (e.g., user -IDs  or   passwords, switch cards, visa 
cards),
204 74.2 7 25.8
C. allocating and withdrawing special facilities from 
users (e.g., ability to use certain utilities, higher levels 
of clearance in a hierarchy),
95 70.9 80 29.
D. protecting the security tables stored on the system, 
which are used by the system to verify authenticity 
(e.g., password control files, communication control 
tables can be one-way encrypted).
97 7.6 78 28.4
2. Passwords (or other codes) are used to identify in-
dividuals to the   system  as authorized users; are there 
adequate procedures to ensure that the passwords are:
A. periodically changed, 226 82.2 49 7.8
B. kept secret ( e.g., not written down or displayed on 
screen), 2 84.0 44 6.0
C. not easily guessed, and 227 82.5 48 7.5
D. cancelled for terminated or transferred employees. 227 82.5 48 7.5
Table IV. Software Security & Access Security Controls
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Software Security and Access  
Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Adequate procedures should be implemented  to 
ensure the ability to use the following access control 
functions are itself restricted to appropriate staff with 
no other incompatible duties:
A. granting or changing systems identities, 99 72.4 76 27.6
B. granting or changing the ability to use special 
facilities, 20 76.4 65 2.6
C. changing passwords or other identification codes. 94 70.5 8 29.5
4- Adequate procedures should be implemented to 
prevent unauthorized public access via dial-up (e.g. 
use dial-back, dial-up access restricted to non-confi-
dential information).
59 57.8 6 42.2
5-All the above procedures should be subject to 
adequate supervision by a responsible organization’s 
official.
20 7.8 72 26.2
Table IV (Continued). Software Security & Access Security Controls
The vast majority of the respondents confirmed the existence of an adequate 
combination of software procedures and manual action to prevent unauthorized 
access and to report and investigate persistent attempts to bypass access controls. 
In addition, regular reports of unauthorized access are prepared and submitted to 
the organizations’ management. A high proportion of the respondents (more than 
82 percent) confirmed that strong password systems are used to identify individuals 
to the system as authorized users. Adequate security procedures are implemented 
to ensure that the passwords are periodically changed, kept secret, and could not 
easily be guessed. Passwords are typically immediately cancelled for terminated 
or transferred organization employees.
From Table IV, it seems that there is adequate control over assigning access 
rights to appropriate individuals across Saudi organizations. Moreover, the majority 
of respondents confirmed the adequacy of the security controls implemented 
over granting and revoking authorized access on the system (such as user-IDs or 
passwords, access cards), allocating and withdrawing special facilities from users 
(for example, ability to use certain utilities, hierarchical levels of clearance) and 
protection of security tables stored on the system to verify authenticity (password 
control files, or communication control tables which can be one-way encrypted).
Moreover, most of the respondents (around 7 percent) reported that access 
security control functions (such as granting or changing system identities, granting 
or changing the ability to use special facilities, changing passwords, or other 
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identification codes) are themselves restricted to appropriate organization staff, 
who have no incompatible duties. Furthermore, these procedures are subject to 
adequate supervision by a responsible official in the organization (Table IV). On 
the other hand, the vast majority of the respondents (85. percent) indicated that 
the current insurance covers neither software nor the cost of business interruption 
resulting from a computer mishap. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) show no significant differences 
among Saudi organizations regarding the existence of implementation of the 
software and electronic access security controls (at significance level p 0.05). On 
the other, the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences among 
the points of view of respondent groups regarding the existence and implementation 
of the software and electronic access security control counter-measures in their 
organizations (p 0.05). 
Recommendation: Accordingly, it is advisable to extend current insurance to 
cover software and the cost of business interruption resulting from a computer 
mishap in Saudi organizations. Adequate procedures should be implemented to 
prevent unauthorized public access to the organizations’ accounting information 
systems via dial-up (for example, by use of dial-back, and by dial-up access 
restricted to non-confidential information).
Data security controls
The results reveal that the great majority of the respondents (8. percent) 
affirmed the adequacy of security controls over the manual handling of input and 
output data in their organization (Table V). Moreover, 84.4 percent of respondents 
indicated that their organizations’ data backups are routinely performed according 
to an appropriate schedule, at least daily for frequently updated data and monthly 
for infrequently changing data. Furthermore, all organization data backup media 
reportedly have write protection in place. Again, the majority of the respondents 
confirmed that their organizations’ data diskettes and cartridges are stored in a 
very strong, secure cabinet or a fire-rated safe. Additional backup copies of the 
organizations’ data are usually kept in the nearest branch, for emergency and data 
recovery. According to 80 percent of the respondents a hard copy of particularly 
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critical data is routinely made and securely stored. More than two-thirds of the 
respondents (68.4 percent) indicated that the backup schedules include hard disk 
backups as well.
Data Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Security controls implemented over manual 
handling of input and output data among the 
organization’s departments are adequate:
229 8. 46 6.7
2- Data backups should be routinely prepared. 22 84.4 4 5.6
- Backups are being performed on schedule 
where:
A.  at least daily for frequently updated data, 22 84.4 4 5.6
B. at least monthly for data that changes infre-
quently. 24 87.6 4 2.4
4- Data backups should have write-protect tabs 
in place. 20 7.8 72 26.2
5- A copy of backups should be placed in an off-
site storage. 48 5.8 27 46.2
6- Backups of sensitive data that are stored off-
site should be encrypted to reduce the chance of 
unauthorized exposure.
74 26.9 20 7.
7- A hard copy should be routinely printed for 
particularly critical data. 220 80.0 55 20.0
8- Hard disks include an external hard disk or 
cassette tape as a backup 88 68.4 87 .6
9- The FORMAT command should  be  left off 
the hard disk 07 8.9 68 6.
0- Data encryption should be considered for 
sensitive data (e.g., payroll). 6 42.2 59 57.8
- Work on sensitive data should be limited 
to private offices to reduce the likelihood of 
exposure.
76 64.0 99 6.0
2- The organization should have designated 
adequate custody for sensitive data disks. 00 6.4 75 6.6
-Unattended computers should be turned off 
when data is removed from the system. 85 67. 90 2.7
4- Reformatting of the disk or overwriting of the 
file should be required for extraction of sensitive 
data.
22 44.4 5 55.6
5-Legally binding confidentiality agreements 
should be drafted by employers and signed by 
computer users with access to sensitive data (e.g., 
customer lists).
02 7. 7 62.9
6- Diskettes or cartridges should be stored in a 
secure cabinet or fire-rated safe. 270 98.2 5 .8
7- A documented emergency plan should state:
Table V. Data Security Controls
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Quite a high proportion of the respondents (67. percent) reported that 
unattended computers are turned off when data are removed from the system. Of 
the respondents, 64 percent confirmed that dealing with sensitive data is performed 
in private offices and only by designated officers to reduce the likelihood of their 
exposure (Table V). More than 75 percent of the respondents indicated the existence 
of documented emergency plans, which specified the main steps that should be 
taken when the systems failed, as well as the individuals who are responsible for 
completion of these steps. 
On the other hand, a rather high proportion of the respondents (7. percent) 
reported that backups of sensitive data stored off-site are not encrypted to reduce 
the chance of unauthorized exposure. Moreover, around 58 percent of them 
indicated that data encryption has not been considered for sensitive data (such 
as the payroll, or organizations’ customer lists). Approximately 6 percent of the 
respondents reported that legally binding confidentiality agreements are not drafted 
by employers and signed by employees who have access to sensitive data (e.g., 
customer lists).  Moreover, 6 percent of the respondents confirmed that the format 
command is not left off the hard disk and reformatting of disks or overwriting of 
the files is not a requirement for extraction of sensitive data in their organizations. 
Finally, approximately 64 percent of them indicated that their organizations had 
not designated an adequate custodian for sensitive data disks (Table V).
The Kruskal-Wallis test statistics show no significant differences among 
different organizations (Table XII) and respondent group views (Table XIII) 
regarding the existence and implementation of data security controls counter-
measures in the Saudi environment (at p 0.05). 
Recommendation: According to the above results, it is recommended that 
sensitive data stored off-site should be encrypted to reduce the chance of its 
unauthorized exposure, legally binding confidentiality agreements related to 
sensitive data should be enhanced and adequate provision for the custody of 
sensitive data disks and backups should be strengthened in Saudi organizations.
Off-line programs and data security controls
Off-line computer software and backup copies of data and programs in the 
physical library are no less important than the working data and programs. The 
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questionnaire data (Table VI) revealed that the majority of respondents (82.2 
percent) confirmed the existence of adequate records to identify off-line programs 
and data stored in unique media, where each individual item has external labels 
for easy recognition. 
Off-line Programs and Data Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Where programs and data, including back-up cop-
ies, are physically controlled:
A. Adequate records should be kept to identify pro-
grams/ data uniquely (e.g.  external labels) 226 82.2 49 7.8
B. Adequate security controls should be implemented 
over  issuing and returning of programs/data files:
• to and from the physical library, 20 76.4 65 2.6
• to and from the store to be used for recovery in the 
event of a  disaster, 20 76.4 65 2.6
• to and from the installation , 20 76.4 65 2.6
C. Storage methods should prevent the unauthorized 
removal of programs/data 27 78.9 58 2.
2- The librarian function should be performed by 
a person independent of computer operation and 
programming responsibilities
86 . 89 68.7
- The above procedures should be subject to adequa-
te supervision by a responsible official 27 78.9 58 2.
Table VI. Off-line Programs and Data Security Controls
The findings also show that the majority of the respondents (76.4 percent) 
confirmed the adequacy of security controls over the issuing and returning of 
programs or data files to and from a physical computer library, either for installation 
or for disaster recovery. Furthermore, of the respondents, 78.9 percent indicated 
that the storage methods in their organizations to prevent unauthorized removal of 
stored data and programs are adequate and all the previous procedures are subject 
to adequate supervision by a responsible official in the organization (Table VI). On 
the other hand, more than two thirds of the respondents (68.7 percent) mentioned 
that the librarian functions in their organizations are not performed by individuals 
entirely independently of computer operation and programming responsibilities.
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are no 
significant differences among different Saudi organizations. In contrast, the Kruskal-
Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences among respondent groups 
regarding their opinions on the existence and implementation of off-line program 
and data security control counter-measures in Saudi organizations (at p 0.05).
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Recommendation: It can be concluded that better security controls should 
be implemented over the issuing and returning of program/data files to and from 
physical libraries. Moreover, the librarian functions should be performed by 
individuals who are entirely independent of computer operation and programming 
responsibilities.
Utility security controls
The results reveal that around two thirds of the respondents (66. percent) 
confirmed the adequacy of control procedures implemented to identify all utility 
programs and other special programs (which could be used, for example, to change 
application programs or data, by bypassing normal software access restrictions in 
their organizations). Approximately 55 percent of respondents agreed that the ability 
to use such programs is restricted to appropriate and authorized individuals in their 
organizations (Table VII). Moreover, 57.5 percent of the respondents confirmed the 
adequacy of implemented controls to log and report the use – or even attempt at 
use – of such programs. Furthermore, a regular review of such reports is reported 
to be carried out, usually by a responsible official in the organization, to determine 
and investigate any unauthorized access to the organization’s CAIS.
Utility Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
-If utilities or other special programs could be 
used to change application programs/ data by 
bypassing normal software access restrictions:
 A. Adequate procedures should be implemented to 
identify all programs with this  special status, 82 66.2 9 .8
 B. The ability to use such programs should be 
restricted to appropriate , authorized personnel in  
the organizations
5 54.9 24 45.
 C. Adequate security controls to log and report the 
use, or attempted use, of such programs should be 
implemented. A review of such reports should be 
performed by a responsible official to determine 
and investigate unauthorized access.
58 57.5 7 42.5
Table VII. Utility Security Controls
According to the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) it seems that there are no 
significant differences among different organizations (at p 0.05) regarding the 
existence and implementation of the utilities security control in Saudi organizations. 
On the other hand, the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences 
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among the opinions of different respondent groups regarding the existence 
and implementation of the utilities security control countermeasures in Saudi 
organizations (again, at significance level p 0.05). 
Recommendation: Based on the above results, more attention should be directed 
by Saudi organizations to strengthen utility security controls, to identify all utility 
programs or other special programs and to implement adequate security controls 
over the use, or even attempts at use, of such programs.
Bypassing of normal access security controls
Sometimes it becomes a necessity to bypass normal security controls, to 
achieve specific authorized tasks by internal or external individuals (emergencies, 
or maintenance of program libraries by outside software support, such as software 
vendors, through dial up). In these cases, it is very important to keep such actions 
under strong restrictive security control. The results reveal that 6. percent of the 
organizations’ respondents confirmed the existence of appropriate authorization 
procedures and adequate security controls for bypassing normal security controls 
(Table VIII). Approximately 6 percent of the respondents agreed on the adequacy 
of implemented security controls to prevent, investigate and report any unauthorized 
changes to their organizations’ data files. Moreover, adequate security controls are 
in place to ensure that security is subsequently reinstated whenever normal security 
controls are bypassed in cases of emergency.
Bypassing of Normal Access Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Where it is necessary to bypass normal security 
controls ( e.g. emergencies or maintenance of pro-
gram libraries by outside software support, such as 
vendor, through dial up):
A. is there appropriate authorization before or after 
the event, 74 6. 0 6.7
B. are there adequate controls to :
-ensure that security is subsequently reinstated, 67 60.7 08 9.
2-prevent or report and investigate unauthorized 
changes to data? 60 58.2 5 4.8
Table VIII. Bypassing of Normal Access Security Controls
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are 
significant differences among Saudi organizations (at p 0.05), while no significant 
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differences appear among different respondent groups (Table XIII) regarding the 
existence and implementation of the bypassing of normal access security controls 
in the Saudi environment (at significance level p 0.05). 
Recommendation: Stronger security should be implemented regarding 
the bypassing of normal access controls to prevent, investigate and report any 
unauthorized changes to organizations’ data files. Furthermore, adequate controls 
should be in place to ensure that security is subsequently reinstated whenever 
bypassing of normal security controls has occurred in emergency cases.
User programming security controls
High level programming languages could be used to change organizations’ data 
and manipulate programs and files. The results (Table IX) reveal that slightly more 
than half of respondents (56.4 percent) agreed on the existence and implementation 
of adequate security controls over the use of such programs. They confirmed the 
existence of appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized use of high 
level programming languages, or even an attempt to use them. However, almost 
half of the respondents (48.4 percent) agreed that their organizations did not have 
adequate security controls in place to prevent and report unauthorized use of 
programs written by unauthorized users.
User Programming Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Where users are permitted to use utilities or 
high level programming languages which can 
change data:-
  A- Adequate security controls should be imple-
mented to   prevent the unauthorized use of this 
facility, and to report and investigate unauthori-
zed use or attempts to use it,
55 56.4 20 4.6
 B- - Adequate security controls should be imple-
mented to prevent and report unauthorized use of 
programs written by unauthorized user.
42 5.6  48.4
Table IX. User Programming Security Controls
The Kruskal-Wallis test provides strong evidence that there is a significant 
difference among both organization types (Table XII) and respondent groups (Table 
XIII) regarding the existence and adequacy of implemented user programming 
security controls in Saudi organizations (at p 0.05). 
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Recommendation: The results suggest that there is a need to implement stronger 
security controls to prevent the unauthorized use of high level programming languages. 
Adequate security controls should be implemented to prevent and report unauthorized 
use of programs written by unauthorized users in Saudi organizations.
Division of duties
A high proportion of the respondents (70 percent) confirmed the segregation of 
incompatible accounting duties and tasks in their organizations (that is authorization, 
record keeping and custody). However, a similar segregation is also required regarding 
incompatible computer tasks, to reduce the likelihood of breaching CAIS security 
controls. A majority of the respondents (80.4 percent) agreed on the adequacy of 
the implementation of security controls to prevent computer operators, schedulers, 
data input staff, and other operations personnel from gaining access to program 
documentation and development libraries in their organizations.
 Almost 6 percent of the respondents indicated that computer programmers and 
development personnel are not allowed to gain access to the computer operations 
areas in their organizations. Further, 50.2 percent of the respondents agreed on the 
adequacy of the implemented security controls to prevent systems personnel who are 
responsible for cataloguing functions from gaining access to program documentation 
and development libraries and to prevent them from entering the operations area or 
performing computer operations functions in their organizations (Table X).
Division of Duties Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
- Is a segregation of accounting duties (i.e., 
authorization, record keeping, and custody) 
good and adequate?
9 69.5 84 0.5
2- Are there adequate controls to prevent:
A. Computer operators, schedulers, data input 
staff, and other operations personnel from 
gaining  access to program documentation and 
development libraries,
22 80.4 54 9.6
B. Development personnel from gaining access 
to the computer  operations area, 72 62.5 0 7.5
C. Systems implementation personnel respon-
sible for cataloguing function from gaining 
access to program documentation and develop-
ment libraries, and from entering the opera-
tions area or performing computer operations 
functions?
8 50.2 7 49.8
Table X. Division of Duties Security Controls
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The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) displays significant differences among 
different organizations regarding the existence and implementation of division 
of duties in Saudi organizations. However, it seems that there are no significant 
differences in the opinions of respondent groups (Table XIII) regarding the adequacy 
of the implemented security controls to prevent computer operators, schedulers, 
data input staff, and other operations personnel from gaining access to program 
documentation and development libraries in their organizations (at p 0.05).
Recommendation: In the light of the above, it is suggested that Saudi 
organizations should pay more attention to the segregation of incompatible 
computer tasks and duties. A clear and strict procedure should be put in place 
to prevent computer operators, schedulers, data input staff, and other operations 
personnel from gaining access to program documentation and development libraries. 
Moreover, systems personnel who are responsible for cataloging functions should 
be prevented from gaining access to program documentation and development 
libraries, as well as preventing them from entering the operations area or performing 
computer operations functions.
Output security controls
The majority of the respondents (77. percent) confirmed that all sensitive data 
in their organization are secure and protected. Visual access to the organizations’ 
sensitive information is strongly controlled and restricted only to authorized users 
at the authorized time. Almost 7 percent of the respondents indicated that their 
organizations’ sensitive computer output is secured in a locked cabinet, and that 
strong security procedures are implemented whenever some of these sensitive data 
are printed outside the data centre or central computer room. According to the 
majority of respondents (72.7 percent), shredding machines are available and used 
in their organizations for disposal of confidential and sensitive data. Moreover, this 
task is restricted to security-cleared individuals in the organization (Table XI). 
Output Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
. Visual access to sensitive information should 
be controlled and restricted only to the au-
thorized users in the authorized time.
22 77. 6 22.9
2. Printing of sensitive data outside the data 
centre or central computer room should be 
under security controls
95 70.9 80 29.
Table XI. Output Security Controls
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Output Security Controls Exist Not Exist
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
. Sensitive computer output should be secured 
in a locked cabinet 206 74.9 69 25.
4. Hard copy output should be automatically 
date/time stamped. 24 87.6 4 2.4
5. Adequate controls should be implemented 
over the distribution of computer output and 
reports
25 78.2 60 2.8
6. Copying of computer output  should be 
restricted to authorized individuals in the 
organization
28 79. 57 20.7
7. Adequate security controls should be 
implemented over printed copies of data / 
information 
206 74.9 69 25.
8. Printing and distribution of data and infor-
mation done should be under proper security 
controls, and only by authorized persons in 
the organization.
82 66.2 9 .8
9. Shredding machines should be available and 
used for disposal of confidential data 225 8.8 50 8.2
0. Shredding of sensitive documents should be 
restricted to security cleared personnel. 200 72.7 75 27.
. Input to output reconciliation should be 
implemented. 26 94.9 4 5.
2. Random output / input comparisons should 
be regularly done to verify correct processing. 29 86.9 6 .
Table XI (Continued). Output Security Controls
The vast majority of the respondents (almost 95 percent) confirmed that 
input to output reconciliation is adequately implemented in their organizations. 
A very high proportion of the respondents (87.6 percent) reported that all their 
organizations’ hard copy documents and output are automatically date and time-
stamped. Moreover, 78.2 percent of the respondents confirmed the adequacy 
of the implemented security controls over printing, copying and distributing of 
their computer output and reports. Further, all the previous tasks are restricted to 
the authorized individuals in the organization. In addition, random output/input 
comparisons are regularly carried out to verify correct processing.
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are 
significant differences among organizations regarding the adequacy of implemented 
output security controls in Saudi organizations (at significance level p 0.05). 
Furthermore, it seems that there are significant differences among respondent 
groups (Table XIII) regarding the existence and implementation of the output 
security control counter-measures in their organizations (again at p 0.05).
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Recommendation: According to the above results, it seems that, while the 
majority of the respondents in the Saudi organizations confirmed the adequacy of 
implemented security controls over printing, copying and distributing its output, 
more adequate output security controls should be put in place and directed to secure 
and protect sensitive organization data across Saudi organizations.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an empirical survey was carried out to investigate the existence 
and adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations. 
The paper also investigates the significant differences among different Saudi 
organizations as well as among respondent groups regarding the above research 
issues. The statistical results highlighted a number of inadequately implemented 
CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations and accordingly, some suggestions 
to eliminate these weak points are recommended.
According to the survey results, it is recommended to restrict access to 
organizations’ sensitive data to the authorized employees with defined needs. 
Mandatory vacations of employees should be considered and enhanced personnel 
policies, including the rotation of duties should be enhanced. It is recommended that 
alarms and motion detectors should be installed in areas with a high concentration 
of computer equipment. Installing computers only in areas that are locked and 
kept under surveillance when not in use, placing lockable covers on computers 
and bolting computer to desks or tables should be considered. Further, un-issued 
physical access badges and keys should be under adequate control. Restrictions 
on the complete independence of individuals who are responsible for controlling 
physical access and those who are responsible for programming, system software, 
and accounting control functions should also be considered.
Adequate procedures should be implemented to prevent unauthorized access 
CAIS. Moreover, sensitive data stored off-site should be encrypted to reduce the 
chance of its unauthorized exposure; legally binding confidentiality agreements 
related to sensitive data should be enhanced and adequate custody of sensitive data 
disks and backups should be strengthened in Saudi organizations. 
Adequate security controls should be implemented over the issuing and returning 
of program/data files to and from physical libraries. Librarian functions should 
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be performed by individuals who are entirely independent of computer operation 
and programming responsibilities. More attention should be directed by Saudi 
organizations to strengthen utility security controls, to identify all utility programs 
or other special programs and to implement adequate security controls over the use, 
or even attempted use, of such programs. Stronger security should be implemented 
in the bypassing of normal access controls to prevent, investigate and report any 
unauthorized changes to organizations’ data files. Furthermore, adequate controls 
should be in place to ensure that security is subsequently reinstated whenever 
bypassing of normal security controls has occurred in emergency cases.
Segregation of incompatible computer tasks and duties should be considered. 
A clear and strict procedure should be put in place to prevent computer operators, 
schedulers, data input staff, and other operations personnel from gaining access to 
program documentation and development libraries. Moreover, systems personnel 
who are responsible for cataloging functions should be prevented from gaining 
access to program documentation and development libraries, as well as preventing 
them from entering the operations area or performing computer operations 
functions. Moreover, adequate output security controls should be put in place and 
directed to secure and protect sensitive data across Saudi organizations.
Further investigation could be undertaken to extend and improve this research. 
The intention of the current research has been to evaluate the security controls of 
CAIS in Saudi organizations. However, more research is needed to obtain evidence 
from other developing countries in the Middle East and Gulf countries. Comparative 
studies could be carried out to investigate the significant differences between 
developing and developed countries regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of 
implemented CAIS security controls. Investigating the differences in the opinions 
of CAIS programmers and designers, internal auditors, external auditors and CAIS 
operational staff could be potential avenues for future research. 
6. REFERENCES
ABU-MUSA, A.A. (2004a): “The Threats of Computerized Accounting Information 
Systems: An Empirical Study on Saudi Organizations”, The Public Administration 
Journal, The Public Administration Institute, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, vol. 44, n. , 
pp.509-570. 
60
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
ABU-MUSA, A.A. (2004b): “Investigating The Security Policies of Computerized 
Accounting Information Systems in the Banking Industry of an Emerging Economy: 
The Case of Egypt”, The Business Review of Information Systems, USA, Summer, 
vol. 8, n. , pp. 8-02.
ABU-MUSA, A.A. (2004c): “Investigating the Security Controls of CAIS in an 
Emerging Economy: An Empirical Study on Egyptian Banking Industry”, The 
Journal of Managerial Auditing, UK, vol. 9, Iss.2, pp.272-02.
ABU-MUSA, A.A. (2002): “Computer Crimes: How Can You Protect Your 
Computerized Accounting Information System”, The Journal of American Academy 
of Business, Cambridge, USA, vol. 2, n., September, pp. 9-.
AL-SUDAIRY, M.A.; TANG, N.K. (2000): “Information Technology in Saudi 
Arabia’s Supermarket Chains”, International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management, vol. 28, n.8, pp. 4-56.
BOOCKHOLDT, J.L. (989): “Implementing Security and Integrity in Macro-
Mainframe Networks”, MIS Quarterly, June, pp.5-44.
BUTTROSS, T.E.; ACKERS, M.D. (990): “A Time - Saving Approach To 
Microcomputer Security”, Journal Of Accounting & EDP, vol. 6, Iss. , pp.-
5. 
COFFIN, R.G.; PATILIS C. (200): The Internal Auditor’s Role in Privacy, Internal 
Auditing, Mar/Apr., vol.6, Iss.2, pp.22-28.
COLLIER, P.; DIXON, R.; MARSTON, C. (99): “The Role of Internal Auditor in 
the Prevention and Detection of Computer Fraud”, Public Money & Management, 
Winter, pp.5-6.  
COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY 
COMMISSION (COSO) (992): Internal Control: Integrated Framework, COSO, 
New York.
CROCKETT, B. (99): “Banks Are Leaders in Computer Security”, American 
Banker, November, p.20.
6Abu-Musa        Evaluating the Security Controls of CAIS in Devoloping Countries:...   
CURTISS, R.H. (995), “Four years after massive war expenses Saudi Arabia get 
its second wind,” The Washing ton Re port on Middle East Affairs, September, 
pp.48- 52.
DICKINSON (990): Statistical Analysis in Accounting and Finance, Philip Allan, 
London.
DHILLON, G. (999): “Managing and controlling computer misuse”, Information 
Management & Computer Security, vol. 7, n. 4), pp. 7-75.
DHILLON, G.; BACKHOUSE, J. (2000): “Information Systems Security 
Management in the New Millennium”, Communication of the ACM, Association 
for Computing Machinery, New York, vol. 4, Iss. 7, pp.25-29. 
DOOST, R. K. (990): “Accounting Irregularities And Computer Fraud”, National 
Public Accountant, vol. 5, Iss. 5, pp.6-9.
DOUGAN, J. (994), “Internal Control Checklist for Hospitality Computer 
Systems”, Bottom Line, vol. 9, Iss. 5, pp. 8-.
FURNELL, S.M.; DOWLAND, P.S. (2000): “A conceptual architecture for real-
time intrusion monitoring”, Information Management & Computer Security, vol. 
8, Iss. 2, pp.65-75. 
HENRY, L. (997): “A Study of the Nature and Security of Accounting Information 
Systems: The Case of Hampton Roads, Virginia”, The Mid-Atlantic Journal of 
Business, vol. , Iss.  6, pp.7-89.
HESSLER R.M. (992): Social Research Methods, West Publishing Company, 
New York, USA. 
HOOD, K.L.; YANG, J.W. (998): “Impact of Banking Information Systems 
Security on Banking in China: The Case of Large State-Owned Banks in Shenzhen 
Economic Special Zone- An Introduction”, Journal of Global Information 
Management, vol. 6, n. , pp.5- 5.
HUNTON, J.; WRIGHT, A.; WRIGHT, S. (2005): “Business and Audit Risks 
Associated With ERP Systems: Knowledge Differences between Information 
62
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
Systems Audit Specialists and Financial Auditors”, Journal of Accounting 
Information Systems (Forthcoming). 
INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT (200): Part2: Specification for 
Information security management systems AS/NZS 7799.2, BS 7799.2:2002
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (200): Code of practice for Information 
Security Management AS/NZS ISO/IEC 7799.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AUDIT AND CONTROL FOUNDATION (ISACF) 
(998): Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), 
Rolling Meadows, Il.
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS (IFAC), Information 
Technology Committee, (998): International Information Technology Guidelines: 
Managing Security of Information, New York.
JASIMUDDIN, S. (200): “Analyzing the competitive advantages of Saudi Arabia 
with Porter’s model”, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, vol. 6, n., 
pp.59-68.
JENKINS, B.; COOKE, P.; QUEST, P. (992): An Audit Approach to Computers, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Moorage Place, 
London.
KPMG (2000): Information Security Survey 2000, Executive Summary, April, 
KPMG, London.
MAU, S.; CATLIN, J. (99): “Systems Security In 90’s”, Interpreter, January, 
pp.8-9.
MEALL, L. (992): “Computer Crime: Foiling the Fraudsters”, Accountancy, 
November, pp.56-57.
MELVILLE, S.; GODDARD, W. (996): Research Methodology: An Introduction 
for Science and Engineering Students, Juta and Co. Ltd, Kenwyn.
MILLER, D. C. (99): Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 
Fifth Edition, SAGE Publications, London.
6Abu-Musa        Evaluating the Security Controls of CAIS in Devoloping Countries:...   
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (996): 
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, 
September. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (998): 
Federal Computer Security Program, Managers’ Forum Working Group, Guide 
for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems, Special 
Publication 800-8, December. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (200): 
Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory, Standards for 
Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, Initial 
Publication Draft, Version .0, May.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD (POB) (2000): The Panel on Audit Effectiveness: 
Report and Recommendations. www.pobauditpanel.org
QURESHI, A.A.; SIEGEL, J.G. (997): “The Accountant And Computer Security”, 
The National Public Accountant, Washington, May, vol. 4, Iss. , pp. 2-5.
ROCKWELL, R. (990): “The Advent of Computer Related Crimes”, Secured 
Lender, Jul /Aug, pp.40-42.
SOHAIL, M., AL-ABDALI, O. (2005): “The usage of third party logistics in Saudi 
Arabia Current position and future prospects”, International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, vol. 5, n. 9, pp.67-65. 
SOLMS, R.V. (996): “Information Security Management: The Second Generation”, 
Computer & Security (UK), pp.28-288. 
SIPONEN, M.T. (2000): “A conceptual Foundation for Organizational Information 
Security Awareness”, Information Management and Computer Security, Bradford, 
vol. 8, Iss. 8, pp.-44.
64
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) (200): 
Information Security: Computer Controls over Key Treasury Internet Payment 
System, Report to Congressional Requesters, July.
WACKERLY, D.D.; MENDENHALL, W.; SCHEAFFER, R.L. (996): 
Mathematical Statistics with Applications, Duxbury Press, Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, London.
WARREN, M.J. (2002): “Security practice: survey evidence from three countries”, 
Logistics Information Management, vol. 5, Iss. 5/6, pp.47-5.
WHITE, G.W.; PEARSON, S. J. (200): “Controlling corporate e-mail, PC use and 
computer security”, Information Management & Computer Security, vol. 9, Iss. 2/; 
pp.88-9.
WRIGHT, S.; WRIGHT, A. (2002): “Information system assurance for enterprise 
resource planning systems: Implementation and unique risk considerations”, 
Journal of Information Systems, vol. 6, Supplement, pp.99-.
YAVAS, U.; YASIN, M. (994): “Manufacturing versus Service Organizations: An 
Investigation of Informational and Operational Interactions in the International 
Domain”, Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 24-29. 
YAVAS, U. (997): “Management Know-How Transfer To Saudi Arabia: A 
Survey Of Saudi Managers”, Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 97, n. 
7, pp.280-286. 
YAVAS, U.; YASIN, M. (999): “Organizational Significance and Application of 
Computer Skills: A Culturally- Based Empirical Examination”, Cross cultural 
Management – An International Journal, vol. 6, n. 4.
ZVIRAN, M.; HAGA, W.J. (999): “Password Security: An Empirical Study”, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, vol.5, Iss.4, pp.6-85.
